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Abstract
This article explores the concept of Natura Pura. It addresses its aspects both 
from the point of Scholastic thought as seen especially in the thinking of 
Thomas Aquinas. It also addresses the metaphysical question in relation to the 
thought of Aquinas and Henri de Lucbac.
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For in me, a real and personal human being, in my concrete nature – that 
nature I have in common with all real men, to judge by what faith teaches 
me, and regardless of what is or is not revealed to me either by reflective 
analysis or by reasoning – the desire to see God cannot be permanently 
frustrated without an essential suffering.1 
So writes Henri de Lubac in his 1965 work The Mystery of the Super-
natural. This argument is key to his epochal jeremiad against the es-
tablished understanding of the relationship between the natural and 
the supernatural. The scholastic tradition depended upon a concept 
of natura pura to elucidate the completely gratuitous nature of God’s 
grace to man. De Lubac spent a lifetime fighting against this theo-
ry claiming that such a concept was totally unhelpful because such 
a pure nature has never existed. In fact, as seen in the quote above, he 
insists that human nature cannot be understood in abstraction from 
its supernatural finality. As he says: “God’s call is constitutive.”2 This, 
de Lubac argues, is the teaching of Saint Thomas Aquinas, and the 
tradition of natura pura is that of the baroque scholastics, especially 
Cajetan, whom Gilson – writing to de Lubac – called the corrupto-
rium Thomae.3 
Yet, is this true? Is man, as he exists historically, only able to be 
understood as having a supernatural finality? Does such a thing as “na-
tura pura” have any coherence, or is it just a chimera of the decadent 
centuries after the Council of Trent? Studying Saint Thomas’ texts con-
cerning the various historical states of nature, I hope to show that de 
Lubac’s reading of Aquinas is a bit too simple. Human nature – I argue 
– can be, and by Aquinas is, understood in abstraction from the call 
to supernatural beatitude, and in fact such a “pure” concept of nature 
is actually necessary for theological knowledge of the first Adam, the 
second Adam, and all those who come in between. 
Human nature exists only in the concrete and it has a history. The 
historicity of man is a  modern concept,4 however it is a  reality that 
Aquinas understood. Jean-Pierre Torrell has written a  magisterial 
1 H. de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, New York 1967, p. 69–70.
2 H. de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supernatural, p. 70.
3 E. Gilson, Letters of Etienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac, San Francisco 1988, p. 24.
4 B. Lonergan, The Transition from a Classicist Worldview to Historical-Minded-
ness, in: A Second Collection, London 1974, p. 1–9.
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article5 on Aquinas’ teaching on the various historical states of human 
nature. We will treat four different existential states: Adam before the 
fall, man after the fall, the God-man, Jesus Christ, and redeemed man. 
 Saint Thomas teaches that man was created in grace.6 This truth of 
faith7 was much controverted in the 12th and 13th centuries. Such greats 
as Albert and Bonaventure held the opposing position. They believed 
that man was first created in a  purely natural state and only conse-
quently was he elevated to a supernatural level.8 However, Thomas es-
pouses the opposite position from the very beginning of his career.9 He 
insists that man was created in a state of innocence or original justice 
that included the gifts of both nature and grace. He analyzes at length 
in what such a state consisted. In the Compendium Theologiae he says, 
“Man in his creation was shaped by God in such a way that his body 
was absolutely subject to his soul, the lower powers willingly subject to 
reason, and reason itself subject to God…of these three things, the last 
was the cause of the other two.”10 The supernatural gift of sanctifying 
grace in man was the cause of the perfect ordering of his nature. In 
a sense, this original state of man is “natural”11 to him since it was God’s 
intention for man to exist in supernatural relation with Him. 
However, while Saint Thomas believes that man was created in 
grace, he does not exclude the possibility that it could have been oth-
erwise. He states explicitly, following a  common tradition, that man 
(and angels) could have been created in pura naturalia.12 Pura naturalia 
is used by Aquinas to define that which man could do with only the 
goods of nature as opposed to his capabilities with the gratuita, the 
goods of grace.13 This notion is not the same as that of natura pura, 
5 J. P. Torrell, Nature and Grace in Thomas Aquinas, in: S. T. Bonino (ed.) Sur-
naturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought, Ave Maria 
2009, p. 155–188. 
6 ST I.95.1. 
7 Council of Trent, Sessio V, DZ 1511.
8 Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 158 quoting Bonaventure, In II Sent, d. 29, a. 2, q. 2.
9 Cf. In II Sent, d 29. q. 1 a. 2. Cited by Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 160–1.
10 Compendium Theologiae I,186. Cited by Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 163–4.
11 This is in fact the third “bonum naturae” that Aquinas believes Adam pos-
sessed. He treats this when speaking about the effect of original sin on man’s nature in 
ST I.II.85.1. “Bonum natura potest tripliciter dici…”
12 Cf. Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 168–169 for the relevant citations.
13 This distinction comes up in Aquinas’ questions about whether or not man 
could love God above all things with a purely natural love. Thomas Osborne has written 
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which will develop in the 16th century, but it does serve a  somewhat 
similar purpose, namely, to draw out “a concept of nature that has its 
autonomy in relation to grace.”14 
Aquinas also distinguishes in this state of innocence what he calls 
“integral nature.”15 As Torrell defines it, integral nature, “designates the 
state of Adam before the fall, hence in possession of the privileges with 
which God endowed him at the moment of his creation, but abstracting 
from sanctifying grace.”16 This integral nature is set against natura corrupta, 
which is the concept that Thomas uses when speaking of man’s state 
after the fall. Natura integra (including the perfect ordering of the lower 
appetites to the higher) as it was in Adam before his sin enabled him 
to “do the good connatural to him.”17 This includes all the goods of the 
acquired virtues – including, for example, right relationship to God es-
tablished by the virtue of religion.18 Adam’s integral nature has as its end 
that which Aquinas defines as connatural and proportionate.19 Thomas in 
so doing is affirming the autonomy and integrity of the natural order, an 
order, which is always already ordered to God (or as one author calls it 
“theonomic”), if not yet supernatural. The nature of Adam as a spiritual 
being has a certain ontological density with coherent ends and powers, 
which, even when elevated by sanctifying grace in the state of innocence, 
remain truly natural. Man’s natural love of God is included within the 
greater supernatural love for the Trinity, yet this natural love is still truly 
and fully a natural reality – the fulfillment of man’s proportionate or con-
natural end. Adam, in willing his supernatural end, was also willing his 
natural end as well. The lower is taken up into the higher, not negated. 
After the primordial sin, however, man’s status changes. He no lon-
ger possesses the gifts of his original innocence. Rather, he loses the 
gifts of both grace and nature. He loses sanctifying grace, and with it 
the harmony that existed between the soul and body and between the 
lower faculties and the higher. He exists in the state of natura corrupta.20 
definitive study of this highly controverted question, see his Love of Self and Love of God 
in Thirteenth Century Ethics, Notre Dame 2005.
14 Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 169. 
15 Again see Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 170–172 for the texts.
16 Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 171.
17 ST I.II.109.3. 
18 ST I.II.109.2. 
19 These are basically the goods of the natural law laid out in ST I.II.94.2. 
20 Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 172–179. 
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Yet, man in his fallen state does not cease to be a human, his nature 
is not totally corrupted or destroyed. He retains a real human nature, 
though a wounded one. Thomas outlines in what this natura vulnera-
ta consists. He says, regarding the threefold good of nature found in 
Adam, that “the first good of nature is not taken away nor diminished 
through sin. The third good of nature is totally destroyed by the sin of 
the first parents. But the middle good of nature, which is the natural 
inclination to virtue, is diminished through sin.”21 Man in fallen nature 
lacks sanctifying grace, and he has a weakened inclination to the good 
but he retains the “principles of which nature is constituted, and the 
properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so 
forth.”22 As Torrell explains it: “What belongs to man’s specific nature 
was not diminished: he could not lose his substantial parts, nor the 
capability of his mind to seek the truth, nor his freedom of choice.”23 
Yet, the operations of these principles are diminished and so man suf-
fers from the wounds of sin: ignorance in the intellect, malice in the 
will, and concupiscence and weakness in the passions.24 These wounds 
affecting the operation of the powers of human nature make it impos-
sible for man in the state of natura corrupta to achieve even his pro-
portionate natural end that is inscribed into his natural inclinations,25 
let alone his supernatural end that (prior to the infusion of sanctifying 
grace) exists only extrinsically through God’s call.26 This is the state of 
man in original sin. This is the initial, existential state of all (excepting 
Our Lord and Our Lady) the children of Adam – men and women 
suffering from the wounds of sin. 
Jesus Christ came to free humanity from the bonds of sin. He came 
to empower man, existing in natura corrupta, to achieve the fullness 
of his nature, and to return him to the divine friendship that Adam 
and Eve enjoyed in the beginning. Jesus was a man, with a human na-
ture like ours. But was the nature assumed by the Divine Logos natura 
humana integra, natura humana corrupta, or something else? Aquinas 
holds that Christ assumed a human nature with all of its proper parts: 
21 ST I.II.85.1.
22 ST I.II.85.1.
23 Torrell, “Nature and Grace”, 174.
24 ST I.II 85. 3.
25 ST I.II.109.4.
26 Cf. ST I.II 62.1. 
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a body and a soul with all of its faculties and inclinations.27 The human 
nature of Christ was perfect in every way that was fitting for his mis-
sion as the Redeemer. This means he had the fullness of grace and of 
the virtues (though not faith) and his passions were perfectly subjected 
to his reason.28 He also took on various defects, namely those that are 
“to be found amongst all men in common, by reason of the sin of our 
first parent, as death, hunger, thirst, and the like.”29 However, he did not 
take on those aspects of our corrupted nature, which are incompatible 
with the perfection of knowledge and grace like “ignorance, a prone-
ness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing.”30 Thus, the human 
nature of the God-man is neither an integral nature, because he suf-
fers from defects which Adam did not know in the beginning, nor is it 
a corrupt nature, because it enjoyed freedom from the wounds of sin, 
namely, ignorance, malice, and concupiscence. Natura humana is, thus, 
seen to exist in a unique third state in the person of Jesus Christ. He, 
as perfect man, is able to reveal again to man both his true dignity and 
also give him the power to attain to it.
It is to the man redeemed by Christ, that we now turn as we ex-
amine the fourth and last existential state of human nature. All men 
come into this world in a state of corrupt nature.31 As we saw above, 
man in this state is incapable of reaching even his natural good due 
to the wounds of nature.32 Nevertheless, his nature has retained its 
original goodness. His faculties, while wounded in operation, are still 
radically oriented to the true and the good. It is to man in this state 
that Christ’s grace is addressed. This grace flowing from Christ the 
head33 to all men is offered to both heal man and to elevate him.34 In 
the justified human person grace acts to reorder his nature. He be-
comes able to order his whole life to God as his final end, and to love 
him above all things through charity. Yet, even when he has oriented 
his life to God there remain in him the effects of original sin. The life 
27 Cf. ST III.5. 
28 ST III.7, 14, 15. 
29 ST III.14.4.
30 ST III.14.4
31 Romans 3:23: omnes enim peccaverunt et egent gloriam Dei.
32 Cf. Torrell’s treatment of what fallen man can achieve without grace in “Nature 
and Grace”, 180–182.
33 ST III.8
34 ST I.II.109.1–2. 
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of grace naturally develops in such a way that the effects of original 
sin diminish, however, they never completely disappear.35 The life of 
grace initiated at baptism has its end in glory. In glory human nature 
is freed from all the wounds and defects from which it suffers while in 
this life. In heaven man lives a life of perfect beatitude in which both 
his proportionate and connatural good and his supernatural good are 
completely fulfilled. God is truly all in all. 
Human nature exists only in individuals and historically it has 
passed through various states. Yet, as we have seen in the preceding 
analysis of these historic states there remain some constants that 
perdure throughout. Adam, Moses, Jesus and Henri de Lubac – they 
all existed in somewhat different historical states, yet they are all 
men. What is it that allows us to meaningfully speak of them as all 
individual beings of the human species? What is human nature at its 
most basic? 
Aquinas, as we saw above, offers a very helpful indication when 
speaking about the repercussions of original sin. He delineates that 
which constitutes human nature, which remains even after sin. He 
mentions the “principles of which nature is constituted, and the 
properties that flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and 
so forth.”36 With this text as a  starting point we can lay out more 
clearly what exactly these constitutive principles and their proper-
ties are.37 Man is a rational animal.38 He has a soul and a body. His 
soul possesses various powers: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, loco-
motive, and intellective.39 These powers are distinguished by their 
acts, and their acts by their objects, and their objects by their ends.40 
A power with a more universal end is higher than one with a lower 
end.41 Thus, in man, his highest powers, and therefore those, which are 
35 ST III.69.3
36 ST I.II.85.1
37 Aquinas lays out an extensive overview of the nature of man, his body, soul, and 
faculties in the Treatise de Homine, ST I.75–83. 
38 ST I.75
39 ST I.78.1. 
40 ST I.77.3
41 ST I.77.3 ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod potentia superior per se respicit univer-
saliorem rationem objecti quam potentia interior, quia quanto potentia est superior, tanto ad 
plura se extendit. 
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most defining for him, are those that have ens universale as their end.42 
Saint Thomas teaches that the intellect (and by extension the rational 
appetite, or the will) is the most specifying principle in man.43 As he 
says in the book II of the Summa Contra Gentiles, “It [the possible 
intellect] is the most noble and the most formal thing in him. Hence, 
man derives his specific nature from it.”44 It is his activity of intellec-
tion that sets him apart from the rest of animals and thus provides for 
his specific difference. 
Man’s intellectual power is his highest and most dignified part of 
his nature and thus man’s perfection consists in the perfection of this 
power.45 The nature of the intellect is such that it is ordered to universal 
being, and as the classic axiom says, est quodammodo omnia. Thus, the 
intellect has a natural desire46 to know the fullness of truth. But, here it 
seems like the discourse about man has to become supernatural since 
the fullness of the truth is only attainable in a vision of God who is the 
subsisting First Truth. Aquinas does insist that man’s beatitudo ultimo 
is the vision of God’s essence through the lumen gloriae.47 But he also 
insists that man has a natural proportionate end that is the contempla-
tion of God as the first cause. This natural end is referenced many times 
by the Aquinate, as Steven Long and Lawrence Feingold48 have shown. 
In particular, it is interesting to note that Aquinas speaks about this 
natural end as essential to distinguishing the human soul from angels. 
In the seventh of the Quaestiones Disputate de Anima, the objector had 
argued: “That which is of the same is seen to be of the same species, 
for each is ordered to the end by its form, which is the principle of the 
species. But the end of an angel and of a soul is the same, that is eternal 
beatitude…therefore an angel and a  soul are of the same species.”49 
Aquinas responds briefly, yet importantly, saying: “Those beings whose 
42 ST I.78.1. 
43 ST I.76.1
44 SCG II.60.4 
45 ST I.II.3.2. 
46 Cf. L. Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St. Thomas and His 
Interpreters, Ave Maria 2010, where he lays out at length, in all its analogicity, what ap-
petitus naturalis means for Aquinas.
47 ST I.12; SCG III.48–54.
48 L. Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God; S. Long, Natura Pura, New York 2010.
49 Questiones Disputatae de Anima, 7, 10: Quorum est idem finis uidetur esse eadem 
species, nam unumquodque ordinatur ad finem per suam formam, que est principium specie. 
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same proximate and natural end is one and the same are one according 
to species. However, beatitude of eternal life is the ultimate and super-
natural end. Therefore the reason does not follow.”50 If eternal beatitude 
were the natural end of man, then man would be indistinguishable from 
angels. However, man’s natural end as a rational animal is the contem-
plation of the first cause as known through nature.51 Thus for man (and 
angels) there are two ends: one, which is proportioned to his nature and 
its powers, and another to which he is called by God and to which he 
is able to attain only by some supernatural help from God.52 God is al-
ways man’s end. His nature, like all of creation is inherently theonomic 
in that it bears the impress of the eternal law.53 The difference between 
the two ends is not that one is divine and transcendent and the other 
human and mundane, rather it is that both attain to God, but under 
different formalities – one natural and the other supernatural.
Human nature, the composite of a rational soul and a body, thus 
has a coherency to it. It has its own natural powers and correspond-
ing natural end. Yet, this does not make man a  being closed in on 
himself. He is inherently open to all being, and even more, his facul-
ties, because they are spiritual, are uniquely open to being raised to 
a transcendent and supernatural end. This inherent openness to being 
elevated to a supernatural end is called a specific obediential potency. 
It is not a mere non-repugnance, as de Lubac feared, rather it is an 
essential aspect of the nature of the human spirit. As M.J. le Guil-
lou put it, “Spirit is, by its structure, raised above itself, there is in it 
a call to an exit from the self, a call to realize itself in a transcendental 
term. Therefore, it aims for that which is beyond its connatural end, 
Set angeli et anime est idem finis, scilicet beatitudo eterna… ergo angelus et anima sunt eius-
dem specie. (My translation).
50 Quaestiones de anima, 7, ad 10: Ad decimum dicendum quod ea quorum est unus 
finis proximus et naturalis sunt unum secundum speciem. Beatitudo autem uite eterne est 
finis ultimus et supernaturalis. Vnde ratio non sequitur. (My translation). Long notes that 
neither this text nor its cognate, ST I.75.7 ad 1, is cited in the entire corpus of de Lubac, 
Cf. Natura Pura, 242–3. 
51 A well developed treatment of in what this natural end would consist is found 
in the little known work by Joseph Buckley, Man’s Last End, St. Louis 1949. Jacques 
Maritain called this a type of felicity in motion. Cf. An Introduction to the Basic Problems 
of Moral Philosophy, New York 1990, 111.
52 Cf. ST I.62.2, and ST I.II.62.3, SCG III.150.5–6.
53 Cf. S. Long, Natura Pura, esp. Chapter 1: “On the Loss, and the Recovery of 
Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections on the Nature/Grace controversy”, 10–51. 
Christopher M. Seiler62
but that does not signify that the human spirit loses its own proper 
consistence.”54 The inherent structure of human nature is such that 
man’s faculties and his natural end are fit, if God so desires, to be taken 
up into the properly divine, the transcendent. This is what Aquinas 
means when he affirms that man is capax Dei.55 He has a unique open-
ness to be elevated to a destiny beyond what he could ever naturally 
ask or imagine (Cf. Ephesians 3:20). This potency is purely passive on 
man’s end and can only be activated by God’s power, yet it is “founded 
upon something positive: namely, upon the intellective and volitional 
powers of man, which are intrinsically spiritual powers manifesting 
the ontological profundity of human nature.”56 
At this point, we can return to the quote from Aquinas with which 
we began this section. He writes in question 85, article 1, of the Prima 
Secundae that after the fall there remained in man the “principles of 
which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, 
such as the powers of the soul, and so forth.” These principles are the 
rational soul and the body, and from them flow the manifold powers 
with their respective teleologies. From these principles is constituted 
what we can call most basically natura humana. This species of being is 
found to be the common unifying reality in all the existential states that 
we saw above. We could even say that this natura humana is in a cer-
tain sense natura pura – nature without reference to grace or sin – just 
nature, pure and simple. These principles and powers remain the same 
throughout the various states of historical realization in which man has 
existed. What changed was the manner in which these powers were 
able to operate. At times they worked perfectly as in pre-lapsarian man, 
or in Christ. Other times they were hindered by the intrinsic wounds of 
nature caused by original sin. Yet, at all times the principles and pow-
ers remain the same, ordering man to the authentic human good. This 
unity of principles and powers with proportionate ends is what we call 
human nature at all times and in all situations. 
54 M.  J.  Le Guillou, Surnaturel, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et The-
ologiques 34 (1950), p. 240. L’esprit est par structure souleve au dela de lui-meme, il y a en 
lui un appel a une sortie de soi, un appel a se realizer dans un terme transcendental. Il vise 
donc toujour au dela de ce qui est sa fin connaturelle, mais cela ne signifie nullement que l ’e-
sprit humain perde tout consistence propre. (My translation).
55 ST III. 9,2, ad 3. 
56 S. Long, On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man, The Thomist 64 
(2000), p. 218.
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Such a concept is necessary for a coherent explanation of how it 
is that Adam, Christ, and you are related. Unless there is a concept 
of nature with a density of its own there is simply no way to explain 
how it is that the fall, or the incarnation, or the infusion of sanctifying 
grace does not cause a substantial change. If it were true that we could 
not consider human nature in the abstract, then when Adam sinned 
he would have no longer remained a man, and when one is baptized 
he would change into something of a different species from what he 
was before. 
Denying such a concept of “pure” nature leads one into the fallacy 
of “concrete nature.”57 This fallacy is one, which de Lubac (and von 
Balthasar) fall into when they, distaining abstraction, insist that their 
concrete existing nature knows only one end, and that supernatural.58 
This insistence that in concreto there exists a nature defined only in 
relation to grace and sin is both not true, and not helpful. Nature as 
it exists in all human beings alive today does suffer from the effects 
of original sin, and in all of them God’s grace is some how at work 
– either habitually or actually – but this does not negate the fact that 
every man and woman share a common nature, and thus belong to 
the same species, which has a real coherence and density in terms of 
both principles and ends. As Le Guillou says so well: “Pure nature 
is not a nature that would be totally strange to us, as it seems P. de 
Lubac thinks: it designates in our world the proper structure of the 
created spirit.”59 
Without a robust philosophical concept of human nature the Chris-
tian faith falls into incoherence. How can one explain the Nicene 
Creed, which claims that the second person of the Holy Trinity took 
on human nature in Jesus Christ, if such a  thing as “human nature” 
does not really exist?60 Without a coherent account of natural human 
ends and purposes discoverable to reason, how can we speak reasonably 
in the public square about what sort of behaviors do or do not perfect 
human nature? Simply put, we need natura pura to carry out the New 
57 Cf. S. Long, Natura Pura, p. 83–91.
58 Cf. the quotes provided by S. Long, Natura Pura, p. 84.
59 Le M. J. Guillou, Surnaturel, p. 242. La nature pure n’est pas une nature qui nous 
serait totalement etrangere, comme semble le penser le P. de Lubac: elle designe dans notre 
monde la structure propre de l ’esprit cree. (My translation).
60 Cf. S. Long, Natura Pura, p. 86–87.
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Evangelization, the work of preaching and teaching the truth, both 
natural and revealed, about God and man.61 
Henri de Lubac sought for the whole of his career to build up and 
renew the Catholic theology by a return to the sources, especially the 
fathers and the scriptures. He was certainly a true vir ecclesiaticus. Nev-
ertheless, his work on the supernatural was flawed by a lack of philo-
sophical precision and a bias against scholasticism. The distinctions and 
concepts of scholastic philosophy and theology, while at times needing 
to be purified of an over reaching rationalism, are the authentic fruit of 
centuries of theological prayer and study. They are a treasure that we are 
invited to share in and pass on in each generation. Thanks to the work 
of many thinkers a part of this tradition, the helpful concept of natura 
pura, has seen a revival. Hopefully, this rediscovery is the harbinger of 
a flowering of a robust metaphysical and sapiential theology, faithful 
to all the sources of the tradition – the scriptures, the fathers, and the 
scholastics, both medieval and baroque – in the years to come. 
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